Crazy Mind, p. 5 Undependability doesn't imply incoherence, of course. But it seems a natural next step in this case, and it would tidily explain the historical fact at hand.
On the first explanation, we could easily enough invent a thoroughly commonsensical metaphysical system if we wanted one, but we don't want one. On the second explanation, we do want one, or enough of us do, but we haven't yet managed to construct it. On the third explanation, we can't have one. I hope you'll agree with me that the third has at least some prima facie merit.
Common sense might be culturally variable. So whose common sense do I take to be at issue in this argument? I suspect it doesn't matter. All metaphysical systems in the philosophical canon, I'm inclined to think, conflict both with the common sense of their milieu and with current Western common sense. Eternal recurrence, windowless monads, and the real existence of an infinitude of possible worlds were never part of any society's common sense.
Some readers will disagree about the existence of the phenomenon I aim to explain; they will think that there is a thoroughly commonsensical metaphysics on the market. To some extent, I'm simply taking as a premise that there is none, and I'm inviting you to agree based on your own reading of historical and contemporary metaphysics. Maybe the premise will appeal better, though, if I highlight its intended scope. It concerns only broad-ranging explorations of fundamental metaphysical issues, especially the issues where seeming absurdities congregate: mind and body, causation, identity, the catalogue of entities that really exist. Some skating treatments and some deep treatments of narrow issues might dodge the charge. metaphilosophical views that treat metaphysics largely as a matter of building a rigorous structure out of our commonsense judgments often envision conflicts within common sense so that common sense cannot be entirely preserved: e.g., Ayer 1967; Kriegel 2011. Crazy Mind, p. 6 Who might count as a thoroughly commonsensical metaphysician? Aristotle, I've sometimes heard. Or Scottish "common sense" philosopher Thomas Reid. Or G.E. Moore, famous for his "Defence of Common Sense" (1925) . Or "ordinary language" philosopher P.F.
Strawson. Or Wittgenstein. But Aristotle didn't envision himself as developing a commonsensical view: In the introduction to the Metaphysics Aristotle says that the conclusions of sophisticated inquiries such as his own will often seem "wonderful" to the untutored and contrary to their initial opinions (4 th c. BCE/1928); and Aristotle generally conceives his project as in part to distinguish the true from the false in common opinion. Moore, though fierce in wielding common sense against his foes, seems unable to preserve all commonsense commitments when he develops his positive views in detail, for example in his waffling about "sense data" (1922, 1953, 1957) . Strawson struggles similarly, especially in his 1985 book, where he can find no satisfactory commonsense account of mental causation. Wittgenstein does not clearly commit to a detailed metaphysical system. Reid I will discuss briefly in section vi.
The argument of this section is an empirical explanatory or "abductive" argument. The empirical fact to be explained is that all metaphysical systems defy common sense. An attractive possible explanation of this fact, I submit, is that common sense is incoherent on matters metaphysical, so that no self-consistent and detailed metaphysical system can satisfy all commonsense constraints.
It doesn't follow that we must abandon appeals to common sense in metaphysics.
Perhaps we could abandon common sense if we had some clearly superior tool to use insteadbut we don't. Or so I will argue in sections ix and x.
ii.
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Let's call a position bizarre if it's contrary to common sense. And let's say that a position is contrary to common sense just in case most people without specialized training on the issue confidently, but perhaps implicitly, believe it to be false. This usage traces back to Cicero, who calls principles that ordinary people assume to be obvious "sensus communis" and who describes violation of common sense as the orator's "worst possible fault" -presumably because the orator's views will then be regarded as ridiculous by his intended audience (1 st c. BCE/2001, p.
60, De Oratore I.ii.12). Common sense is what it seems ridiculous to deny.
To call a position bizarre is not necessarily to repudiate it. The truth is sometimes strange. Relativity theory is bizarre. Various bizarre things are true about the infinite. Common sense errs, and we can be justified in thinking so.
Despite the limitations of common sense, we are not ordinarily justified in believing bizarre things without compelling evidence. In the matters it traverses, common sense serves as an epistemic starting point that we reject only with sufficient warrant. To believe something bizarre on thin grounds -for example, to think that the world was created five minutes ago, or that you are constantly cycling through different immaterial souls (assuming you have no special warrant for these views) -seems crazy. I stipulate, then, the following technical definition of a crazy position: A position is crazy if it's bizarre and we are not epistemically compelled to believe it.
One needn't, of course, be clinically insane to accept crazy views, and not all crazy views are as crazy as the two just mentioned. Many philosophers and some scientists embrace positions contrary to common sense and for which the evidence is less than compelling. In fact, to convert a position from crazy to merely bizarre might be the highest form of academic Crazy Crazyism about a topic, then, is the view that something crazy must be among the core truths about that topic. Crazyism can be justified when we have good reason to believe that one among several bizarre views must be true about the topic in question but where the balance of evidence leaves no individual view decisively supported over all the others. We might find ourselves rationally compelled to believe that either T1, T2, T3, or T4 must be true, where each of the T's is crazy.
Crazyism might be justified in interpreting quantum mechanics. The "many worlds"
interpretation, for example, seems to sharply conflict with ordinary common sense. And it also seems that the balance of evidence does not compellingly favor this view over all competitors.
Thus, the view is crazy in the sense defined. If the same holds for all viable interpretations of quantum mechanics, then crazyism would be warranted in that domain.
3
I will argue below that crazyism is warranted in the metaphysics of mind. I will argue that any well developed materialist metaphysics will be crazy, in the intended sense of the term.
I will argue the same for any well developed dualist metaphysics. And the same for idealism (well developed or not). And the same for positions that reject all three of these views or aim to reconcile or compromise among them. But some metaphysical theory of this sort must be truethat is, either some form of materialism, dualism, or idealism must be true or some sort of Crazy Mind, p. 9 rejection or compromise approach must be true. So something crazy must be among the core truths in the metaphysics of mind.
iii.
To be crazy, a position must be both bizarre and uncompelled by the evidence. Let's consider bizarreness first, and let's consider materialism first.
The materialist (or "physicalist") position is difficult to characterize precisely. 4 This might be a problem for the view -though if so, I'm inclined to think that it's just a manifestation of a more general problem that I'll discuss in section x. As a working approximation, let's characterize materialism as the view that everything in the universe is composed of, or reducible to, or most fundamentally, material stuff, where "material stuff" means things like elements of the periodic table and the various particles or waves or fields that interact with or combine to form such elements, whatever those particles, waves, or fields might be, as long as they are spatial and not intrinsically mental. The two historically most important competitor positions are idealism and substance dualism, both of which assert the existence of an immaterial soul. (1980) . Simple versions of materialism appear to imply that to be in pain is either just to be in a particular brain state or, alternatively, to be in a state that plays a particular causal or functional role relating the system's inputs and outputs (views often associated with Smart 1959 and Putnam 1965 respectively) . But reflection reveals both options to have bizarre implications. If pain requires being in a particular brain state, then no being constructed very differently than us -no hypothetical Martian, for example, who operates by internal hydraulics rather than by neurons with axons and dendrites -could experience pain, no matter how pain-like her outward behavioral patterns. However, if pain, instead, requires being in a particular functional role, then no being, no "mad man", could experience pain that was caused in unusual ways (say, by moderate exercise on an empty stomach) and in turn caused unusual reactions (say, fingersnapping and concentration on mathematics). Also on the second view (a point not emphasized
by Lewis) , any weirdly constructed system -maybe made out of beer cans and windmills (Searle 1984) or out of people trading messages in China (Block 1978 (Block /2007 More generally, to be in pain on Lewis's account and most subsequent materialist accounts is to be in a physical state that normally plays a certain causal role, where "normally" can be understood in various ways, e.g., with reference to a population or with reference to the developmental or evolutionary history of the organism (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995 Tye , 2009 iv.
One alternative to materialism is dualism, the view that people are not wholly material entities but rather possess immaterial souls in addition to their material bodies. (By "dualism", unqualified, I mean substance dualism, which posits an immaterial soul. "Property dualism" I will discuss briefly below.) Although dualism has merits as a first pass at a commonsense metaphysics of mind, from the 17 th century to the present, the greatest philosophers of the Western world have universally found themselves forced into bizarre views when attempting to articulate the metaphysics of immateriality. I regard this history as significant empirical evidence that a well developed metaphysics of substance dualism will unavoidably be bizarre.
Attempts at commonsense dualism founder, it seems, on at least two broad issues: the (Carnap 1928 (Carnap /1967 (Carnap , 1932 (Carnap /1959 maybe Searle 1992 maybe Searle , 2004 . Or maybe asking metaphysical questions of this sort takes us too far beyond the proper bounds of language use to be meaningful. 9 But this type of view, too, seems bizarre. The whole famous mind-body dispute is over nothing real, or nothing it makes sense to try to talk about? There is no fact of the matter about whether something in you goes beyond the merely physical or material? We can't legitimately ask whether some immaterial part of you might transcend the grave? It's one thing to allow that facts about transcendent existence might be unknowable -an agnostic view probably within the bounds of commonsense options -and it's one thing to express the view, as some materialists do, that dualists speak gibberish when they invoke the immaterial soul; but it's quite another thing, a much more radical and unintuitive thing, to say that there is no legitimate sensible interpretation of the dualist-materialist(-idealist) debate, not even sense enough to allow the materialist coherently to express her rejection of the dualist's transcendent hopes. Crazyism requires conjoining universal bizarreness with a second thesis, universal dubiety, to which I will now turn. The universal dubiety thesis is just the thesis that none of the bizarre options compels belief. Even on the fairly thick slicing of the options I've been usingmaterialism vs. dualism vs. idealism vs. compromise/rejection -no one option probably deserves credence in the philosophical community much in excess of 50%.
I offer three arguments for universal dubiety.
viii.
An Argument from Disagreement.
When experts disagree about some proposition, doubt about that proposition is the most reasonable response, unless the opinions of experts on one side can be disregarded. Experts disregard the opinions of experts on all but one side of the dispute, doubt is the most reasonable response. Usual reasons for discounting experts, such as disproportionate ignorance or bias on all but one side, do not seem to apply to the present case.
Thomas Kelly (2005) has argued that you may disregard peer dissent when you have "thoroughly scrutinized the available evidence and arguments" on which your disagreeing peer's judgment is based. But we cannot disregard peer disagreement in philosophy of mind on the grounds that this condition is met. The condition is not met. No philosopher has thoroughly scrutinized the evidence and arguments on which all of her disagreeing peers' views are based.
The field is too large. Some philosophers are more expert on the literature on a priori metaphysics, others on arguments in the history of philosophy, others on empirical issues; and these broad literatures further divide into subliteratures and sub-subliteratures with which philosophers are differently acquainted. Furthermore, epistemic peers, though overall similar in intellectual capacity, tend to differ somewhat in the exact profile of virtues they possess.
Consequently, even assessing exactly the same evidence and arguments, convergence or divergence with one's peers should still be epistemically relevant if the evidence and arguments are complicated enough that their thorough scrutiny challenges the upper range of human capacity across several intellectual virtues -a condition that the metaphysics of mind appears to meet. Some philosophers are more careful readers of opponents' views, some are more facile with complicated formal arguments, some are more imaginative in constructing hypothetical scenarios, etc., and world-class intellectual virtue in any one of these respects can substantially improve the quality of one's assessments of arguments in the metaphysics of mind. Every 
A No-Method Argument.
There is no conscious-ometer. Nor should we expect one soon. There is also no material-world-ometer. The lack of these devices problematizes the metaphysics of mind. Crazy Mind, p. 23
Samuel Johnson kicked a stone. Thus, he said, he refuted Berkeley's idealism (Boswell 1791 (Boswell /1980 Carnap (1928 Carnap ( /1967 imagines an idealist and a non-idealist both measuring a mountain; there is no experiment on which they will disagree. No multiplicity of gauges, neuroimaging equipment, or particle accelerators could give stronger empirical proof against idealism, it seems, than Johnson's kick. Similarly, Smart, in his influential defense of materialism, admits that no empirical test could distinguish materialism from epiphenomenalist substance dualism (1959, p. 155-156) ; there is no epiphenomenal-substance-ometer.
Why, then, should we be materialists? Smart appeals to Occam's razor: Materialism is simpler. But simplicity is a complex business. Arguably, Berkeley's idealism is simpler than either dualism or materialism and solipsism is simpler yet. And anyhow, simplicity is at best one theoretical virtue among several, to be balanced in the mix. Abstract theoretical virtues like simplicity will, I suggest, attach only indecisively, non-compellingly, to the genuine metaphysical contenders. I'm not sure how to argue for this other than to invite you sympathetically to feel the abstract beauties of some of the contending views other than your favorite. Materialism has its beauty. But so does transcendental idealism, and so does neutral monism.
If you're willing to commit to materialism, you might still hope at least for a consciousometer that we could press against a human or animal head to decide among, say, relatively x.
An Argument from Cosmological Crazyism.
If a broad-reaching cosmological crazyism is true, then crazyism in the metaphysics of mind is a natural consequence. If we don't know how the universe works, we don't know how the mind fits within it.
I can't defend cosmological crazyism in detail here, but a few remarks can highlight its plausibility. Consider the bizarreness of quantum mechanics and the lack of consensus about its interpretation, including the fact that some interpretations treat mentality as fundamental (such as the many minds view and some versions of the Copenhagen interpretation 13 ). Consider the bizarreness of relativity theory and the apparent conflict between relativity theory and quantum theory. 14 Consider that many cosmologies now posit either a creator who set the physical 12 Kriegel forthcoming develops a similar argument in more detail, focusing on the ontology of objects as his test case; see also Strawson 2012. 13 See Wigner 1961; Albert and Loewer 1988; Faye 2008. 14 See Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935; Bell 1964; Maudlin 1994 Maudlin /2002 . On inconsistency in scientific theories, see also Norton 2002. constants or initial conditions at the time of the Big Bang so as to support the eventual occurrence of life, or some sort of dependence of the universe upon our observation of it, or the real existence of a vast number of universes with different physical constants or conditions.
15 If the number of universes is infinite, as many cosmologists now think, or if there is even a single infinite universe of the right sort, then every event of finite probability will occur an infinite number of times (given certain background assumptions about cosmic diversity). The spontaneous congealment, from relatively disorganized matter, of a molecule-for-molecule twin of any living person is often held to have a very tiny but finite probability. 16 You would, then, be one among an infinite number of actually existing molecule-for-molecule twins of yourself, of diverse origin. (Shades of Nietzsche's eternal return?) Quantum cosmology has also been interpreted as suggesting the backward causation of the history of the universe by our current acts of scientific observation (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, p. 140 ).
Shall we look, then, to religion for non-bizarre cosmologies? That seems an unlikely source. Creation stories, accounts of the afterlife -especially in the hands of those who would attempt to work out the full ontological implications -seem only a source of further bizarreness.
Another issue is this: If consciousness can be created within artificial networks manipulated by external users -for example in computer programs run by children for entertainment -and if the beings inside those networks can be kept ignorant of their nature, then there could be beings in the universe who are vastly deluded in fundamental matters of metaphysics. Such beings, perhaps, might think they live in a wide world of people like them when in fact they have three-hour lives, isolated from all but their creator and whatever other beings are instantiated in the same artificial environment. There is, I think, a non-negligible possibility that we (I? you?) are such beings. 17 To think that we are in fact such beings is, of course, crazy. But is the possibility too crazy to figure in a disjunction of live cosmological options? Is it more than one order of magnitude crazier than multiverse theory or the typical well developed religious cosmology? There are no commonsense cosmologies left.
Further support for cosmological dubiety comes from our (apparently) miniscule cosmological perspective. If mainstream scientific cosmology is correct, we have seen only a very small, perhaps an infinitesimal, part of reality. We are like fleas on the back of a dog, watching a hair grow and saying, "Ah, so that's how the universe works!"
18
There seems to me to be sufficient cosmological uncertainty to cast materialist metaphysics into doubt. For example, if it might be the case that an immaterial entity fashioned the physical constants, then we cannot justifiably rest assured that materialism is true. If there might really exist actual universes so radically different from our own that cognition transpires without the existence of anything we would rightly call material, then materialism is at best a provincial contingency. If we are created within a simulation by outside agents, our experience of objects as necessarily laid out in space and time might be a feature of our programming environment that doesn't reflect the fundamental structure of the universe (Kant meets cyberpunk).
Scientific cosmology is deeply and pervasively bizarre; it is highly conjectural in its conclusions; it has proven unstable over the decades; and experts persistently disagree on fundamental points. Nor is it even uniformly materialist. 
